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AS A PUBLIC HEALTH ISSUE:  
THE NECESSITY OF TITLE VII PROTECTIONS 
FOR VOLUNTEERS 
Elizabeth R. Langton* 
 
What constitutes an employee is a recurring issue in U.S. employment 
law, especially with respect to volunteers.  Under Title VII, an employee is 
defined as “an individual employed by an employer.”  The U.S. Supreme 
Court has found that this definition is circular and explains nothing.  Given 
the vague statutory definition of “employee,” circuit courts are split over 
the correct test to determine employee status for the purposes of Title VII. 
Workplace discrimination is especially toxic because the majority of the 
adult population spends its waking hours at work.  Thus far, courts have 
been focused on the individual nature of workplace discrimination.  
However, the harms of such discrimination are borne beyond the targeted 
individual and negatively impact coworkers, families, employers, and 
society at large. 
This Note argues that courts must reconceptualize workplace 
discrimination as a public health issue.  Given the health implications, 
courts should reject the overly narrow threshold-remuneration test and 
adopt a broad definition of employee in the interest of public health. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Livingston Parish Fire District No. 5 (“Fire District 5”) is a government 
subdivision of the State of Louisiana and primarily relies on volunteers to 
provide fire and emergency services.1  Rachel Juino was a volunteer 
firefighter with Fire District 5 from November 2009 to April 2010.2  
Although she did not receive a salary, Juino responded to thirty-nine calls 
for which she received $78 in reimbursement.3  She also received a life 
insurance policy, a uniform and badge, and emergency and first responders’ 
training.4 
Soon after she started volunteering at Fire District 5, Juino alleged that a 
male firefighter was sexually harassing her.5  After a physical altercation 
with this male firefighter, Juino allegedly began to fear for her personal 
safety and reported the male firefighter’s conduct to her superiors.6  No 
disciplinary action was taken, and Juino left Fire District 5 in April 2010 
due to continuing harassment.7 
Juino brought a sexual harassment suit against Fire District 5 for 
violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19648 (Title VII).9  The 
Middle District of Louisiana dismissed the Title VII claim, finding that 
Juino was not an “employee” within the meaning of Title VII.10 
Juino appealed to the Fifth Circuit, which addressed the issue as a matter 
of first impression.11  The court found that Juino was not an employee for 
the purposes of Title VII because she did not receive a salary or 
“significant” indirect benefits.12 
Pursuant to Title VII, it is illegal “for an employer to fail or refuse to hire 
or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges 
of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or 
 
 1. See Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire Dist. No. 5, 717 F.3d 431, 432 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 2. See id. 
 3. See id. at 439.  As a volunteer firefighter, Juino was entitled to a $2 reimbursement 
for every emergency call to which she responded. See Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire Dist. 
No. 5, No. 11-466, 2012 WL 527972, at *6 (M.D. La. Feb. 14, 2012), aff’d, 717 F.3d 431 
(5th Cir. 2013) (order granting partial summary judgment for Fire District 5 and dismissing 
Juino’s Title VII claims without prejudice pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) due to lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction). 
 4. See Juino, 717 F.3d at 439. 
 5. Id. at 432.  Juino stated that the male firefighter called her cell phone frequently, 
followed her around the fire department and bragged to other firefighters that he was 
sleeping with her. See Juino, 2012 WL 527972, at *2. 
 6. See Juino, 717 F.3d at 432.  The male firefighter jerked Juino’s head from side to 
side and pulled her air pack valve off her face mask. See Juino, 2012 WL 527972, at *1. 
 7. See Juino, 717 F.3d at 432. 
 8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(17) (2012). 
 9. See Juino, 717 F.3d at 432. 
 10. See Juino, 2012 WL 527972, at *9. 
 11. See Juino, 717 F.3d at 432. 
 12. Id. at 439–40. 
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national origin.”13  Title VII prohibits “harassment that takes the form of a 
tangible employment action, such as a demotion or denial of promotion, or 
the creation of a hostile or abusive working environment.”14 
To sustain a claim under Title VII, an employer must have at least fifteen 
employees “for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks 
in the current or preceding calendar year.”15  Under Title VII, an employee 
is defined as “an individual employed by an employer.”16  The U.S. 
Supreme Court has found that this definition “is completely circular and 
explains nothing.”17  As a result, what constitutes an employee is a 
“recurring question”18 in our nation’s employment laws. 
Given the vague statutory definition of employee, courts have created 
various tests to determine employee status for the purposes of Title VII.19  
These tests include:   (1) the threshold-remuneration test, (2) the common 
law agency test, (3) the economic realities test, and (4) the hybrid test, 
which combines the common law agency and economic realities tests.20  
Courts have used the latter three tests interchangeably, and scholars have 
argued that the economic realities and hybrid tests are simply restatements 
of the common law agency test.21  Therefore, the main question is whether 
courts should adopt the threshold-remuneration test or some formulation of 
the common law agency test. 
In Juino, the Fifth Circuit joined the Second,22 Fourth,23 Eighth,24 
Tenth,25 and Eleventh26 Circuits by adopting a version of the threshold-
 
 13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
 14. Juino, 717 F.3d at 433–34 (citing Lauderdale v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 512 
F.3d 157, 162 (5th Cir. 2007)). 
 15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). 
 16. Id. § 2000e(f). 
 17. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992). 
 18. See Smith v. Castaways Family Diner, 453 F.3d 971, 975 (7th Cir. 2006) (stating 
that what constitutes an employee is “a recurring question”). 
 19. See Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Our Nation’s Forgotten Workers:  The Unprotected 
Volunteers, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 147, 170 (2006). 
 20. See Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Employees, Employers, and Quasi-Employers:  An 
Analysis of Employees and Employers Who Operate in the Borderland Between an 
Employer-and-Employee Relationship, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 605, 658 (2012). 
 21. See Cobb v. Sun Papers, Inc., 673 F.2d 337, 339–40 (11th Cir. 1982) (finding that 
the economic realities tests is merely “a common law type of analysis in which the 
employer’s right to control the employee is the most important factor rather than the 
determinative factor”); Perry v. City of Country Club Hills, 607 F. Supp. 771, 773 n.2 (E.D. 
Mo. 1983). 
 22. See, e.g., O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 116 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that an 
unpaid intern who did not receive remuneration was not an employee under Title VII). 
 23. See, e.g., Haavistola v. Cmty. Fire Co. of Rising Sun, Inc., 6 F.3d 211, 222 (4th Cir. 
1993) (finding that remuneration was dispositive but remanding to determine whether the 
volunteer firefighter’s receipt of indirect benefits was substantial enough to establish an 
employment relationship). 
 24. See, e.g., Graves v. Women’s Prof’l Rodeo Ass’n, 907 F.2d 71, 73–74 (8th Cir. 
1990) (holding that members of a professional rodeo association were not employees under 
Title VII because they did not receive compensation). 
 25. See, e.g., McGuinness v. Univ. of N.M. Sch. of Med., 170 F.3d 974, 979 (10th Cir. 
1998) (finding that a medical student who did not receive remuneration failed to establish an 
employment relationship under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act). 
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remuneration test.  However, the Sixth27 and Ninth28 Circuits have held that 
remuneration alone is not dispositive and should be considered in 
conjunction with other common law agency or economic realities factors.29 
How to determine employee status for the purposes of Title VII remains 
of “paramount concern because liability is almost wholly dependent upon 
employ[ee] status.”30  In these difficult economic times, our nation has 
increasingly relied on the services of volunteers.31  They can be found in 
almost every industry, private and public, and they compose a national 
workforce.32  Volunteers often function like traditional employees, 
reporting to work every day and serving side-by-side with full-time 
employees.33 
However, unlike traditional employees, volunteers are particularly 
vulnerable to abuse because they are not given the same employment rights 
and protections under Title VII because of ambiguity in the law.34  Few 
areas of employment law have been so highly litigated, and “the time is ripe 
for an authoritative distinction” among the various definitions of 
employee.35 
Thus far, courts have focused on the individual nature of workplace 
discrimination, viewing each incident of harassment singularly—only with 
respect to the impact on the particular individual.  They have taken a tort-
like approach, seeking to remedy only the particular harm caused to the 
targeted individual.  However, the extent of the injury extends beyond that 
individual.36 
Courts must reconceptualize discrimination as a broader public health 
issue.37  Discrimination against volunteers creates a toxic work 
environment, even for those individuals who are not the direct targets.  It 
 
 26. See, e.g., Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 1244 (11th Cir. 
1998) (finding that an officer-director of the condominium association who received no 
compensation for her position was not an employee under Title VII). 
 27. See, e.g., Bryson v. Middlefield Volunteer Fire Dep’t, Inc., 656 F.3d 348, 354 (6th 
Cir. 2011) (finding that remuneration is only one dispositive factor and not an independent 
antecedent requirement); Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1340–41 (6th Cir. 1983) 
(finding that “manufacturer’s representatives”—who did not work in the defendant’s 
corporate office, did not exclusively sell the defendant’s product lines, and received no 
compensation other than commissions—could be construed as employees under Title VII). 
 28. See, e.g., Fichman v. Media Ctr., 512 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that 
remuneration was not a dispositive factor when determining whether directors and 
independent producers of a nonprofit media company were “employees” under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act and Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Real v. 
Driscoll Strawberry Assocs., Inc., 603 F.2d 748, 755 (9th Cir. 1979) (“Economic realities, 
not contractual labels, determine employment status . . . .”). 
 29. See Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire Dist. No. 5, 717 F.3d 431, 434–35 (5th Cir. 
2013). 
 30. Rubinstein, supra note 20, at 658. 
 31. See discussion infra notes 70–81, 89–90. 
 32. Rubinstein, supra note 19, at 147. 
 33. Rubinstein, supra note 20, at 658. 
 34. Rubinstein, supra note 19, at 149–50. 
 35. Rubinstein, supra note 20, at 658. 
 36. See discussion infra Part III. 
 37. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
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threatens the health of the entire workforce,38 families,39 employers,40 and 
society at large.41 
Through the lens of public health, this Note explores the circuit split over 
the appropriate test to define “employee” under Title VII and whether 
remuneration should be an initial threshold test.  Part I provides an 
overview of the relevant protections of Title VII, its definition of employee, 
and the legislative history and purpose of the statute.  It then discusses the 
role of volunteers today.  Part II analyzes the various approaches taken by 
the circuit courts in determining whether a volunteer is an employee under 
Title VII.  Part III explores the health effects of workplace discrimination 
on coworkers, families, society, and employers.  Lastly, Part IV argues that 
courts must reconceptualize workplace discrimination against volunteers as 
a public health issue.  Given the public health implications of such 
discrimination, it asserts that courts should reject the threshold-
remuneration test and adopt a broad definition of employee that includes 
volunteers as a prophylactic measure to protect the public interest.  It then 
provides supplemental support for rejecting the threshold-remuneration test 
by citing arguments unrelated to public health. 
I.   BACKGROUND:  UNDERSTANDING TITLE VII 
AND VOLUNTEERS TODAY 
This part provides an overview and background of Title VII.  It then 
defines “volunteer” for the purposes of this Note and discusses the role of 
volunteers today. 
A.   Background and Overview of Title VII 
This section discusses the protections and privileges under Title VII.  It 
then examines the definitions of “employee” under Title VII.  Lastly, it 
explores the legislative history and purpose of Title VII. 
1.   Protections and Privileges Under Title VII 
Pursuant to Title VII, it is illegal “for an employer to fail or refuse to hire 
or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges 
of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin.”42  As a result, Title VII prohibits “harassment that takes 
the form of a tangible employment action, such as a demotion or denial of 
promotion, or the creation of a hostile or abusive working environment.”43 
 
 38. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 39. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 40. See discussion infra Part III.D. 
 41. See discussion infra Part III.C. 
 42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012). 
 43. Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire Dist. No. 5, 717 F.3d 431, 433–34 (5th Cir. 2013) 
(citing Lauderdale v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 512 F.3d 157, 162 (5th Cir. 2007)). 
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The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) enforces 
federal laws, such as Title VII, that prohibit workplace discrimination.44  
Across all federal statutes, in fiscal year 2013, the EEOC received 93,727 
private sector workplace discrimination charges from October 1, 2012 to 
September 30, 2013.45  The claims most frequently levied in these 
discrimination charges were: (1) retaliation (all statutes) at 38,539, (2) race 
at 33,068, (3) sex at 27,687, and (4) disability at 25,957.46  During the same 
period, the EEOC obtained $372.1 million for victims of workplace 
discrimination.47  For Title VII alone, the EEOC received 67,558 charges 
and resolved 70,175 charges in fiscal year 2013.48  The EEOC secured 
$255.9 million for victims of Title VII discrimination during the same time 
period.49 
2.   Definition of “Employee” Under Title VII 
Employee status is a “long-recognized rub”50 and a “recurring 
question”51 in our nation’s employment laws.  To sustain a claim under 
Title VII, an employer must have at least fifteen employees “for each 
working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or 
preceding calendar year.”52  An employee is defined as “an individual 
employed by an employer,”53 which the Supreme Court has found to be a 
circular definition that explains nothing.54  As a result, circuit courts are 
split over the correct test to determine whether an individual is an 
employee. 
Other employment statutes fail to provide clarity.  “[T]he statutory 
language defining employee status in virtually all of our nation’s 
employment laws is vague, conclusory, and largely useless.”55  The 
 
 44. Charge Statistics:  FY 1997 Through FY 2013, EEOC, http://www.eeoc. 
gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited Nov. 26, 2014). 
 45. Id.  The number of total charges is the number of individual charge filings received 
by the EEOC. Id.  Since claimants may file charges asserting multiple bases (e.g., retaliation, 
race, sex, disability and age), the number of total charges is less than the number of total 
bases of discrimination for 2013. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Press Release, EEOC, EEOC Releases FY 2013 Enforcement and Litigation Data 
(Feb. 5, 2014), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/2-5-14.cfm. 
 48. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Charges (includes concurrent charges with 
ADEA, ADA and EPA) FY 1997–FY 2013, EEOC, http://www1.eeoc.gov/eeoc 
/statistics/enforcement/titlevii.cfm (last visited Nov. 26, 2014).  The EEOC carries over 
unresolved charges from previous fiscal years, which means that it often resolves more 
charges than it receives. Id.   
 49. Id. 
 50. FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 496 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (finding that 
employment status is not subject to a bright-line test). 
 51. Smith v. Castaways Family Diner, 453 F.3d 971, 975 (7th Cir. 2006) (stating that 
what constitutes an employee is “a recurring question”). 
 52. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2012). 
 53. Id. § 2000e(f). 
 54. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992) (describing the 
same definition of employee under ERISA). 
 55. Rubinstein, supra note 20, at 608. 
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Supreme Court has even acknowledged that there is not one “simple, 
uniform and easily applicable test” and that “[f]ew problems in the law have 
given greater variety of application and conflict in results than the cases 
arising in the borderland between what is clearly an employer-employee 
relationship.”56 
In an effort to clarify, the Supreme Court provided that, “when Congress 
has used the term ‘employee’ without defining it, we have concluded that 
Congress intended to describe the conventional master-servant relationship 
as understood by common-law agency doctrine.”57  The Court explained 
that, “[i]n determining whether a hired party is an employee under the 
general common law of agency, we consider the hiring party’s right to 
control the manner and means by which the product is accomplished.”58  
This test, also known as the common law agency test, is discussed in greater 
detail in Part II.B.59 
Several courts have asserted that the common law agency test does not 
immediately apply in the volunteer context because, unlike independent 
contractors, there is a threshold question as to whether volunteers are “hired 
parties.”60  These courts apply what is known as the threshold-remuneration 
test, which is discussed in Part II.A.61 
3.   Legislative History and Purpose of Title VII 
Congress intended for Title VII to grant all individuals the right to be 
employed without discrimination62 and to eliminate discrimination in 
employment contexts.63  Title VII sought “to assure equality of employment 
opportunities, in particular to protect employees with little bargaining 
power.”64 
 
 56. See NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 120–21 (1944). 
 57. Darden, 503 U.S. at 322–23 (citing Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 
U.S. 730, 739–40 (1989)). 
 58. Id. at 323–24 (quoting Reid, 490 U.S. at 751). 
Among the other factors relevant to this inquiry are the skill required; the source of 
the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work; the duration of the 
relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party has the right to assign 
additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party’s discretion over 
when and how long to work; the method of payment; the hired party’s role in 
hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the regular business of the 
hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of employee 
benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party. 
Reid, 490 U.S. at 751–52. 
 59. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 60. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 61. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 62. See H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, at 26 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2401. 
 63. See Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1340 (6th Cir. 1983) (“Title VII . . . was 
enacted for the sole purpose of eliminating discrimination.”); accord Craig J. Ortner, 
Adapting Title VII to Modern Employment Realities:  The Case for the Unpaid Intern, 66 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2613, 2622–23 (1998). 
 64. Nicola Kean, The Unprotected Workforce:  Why Title VII Must Apply to Workfare 
Participants, 9 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 159, 166 (2004) (citations omitted). 
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The Supreme Court has given this intent significant weight when 
defining the scope of Title VII.  The Court stated: “Congress itself has 
indicated, a ‘broad approach’ to the definition of equal employment 
opportunity is essential to overcoming and undoing the effect of 
discrimination.  We must therefore avoid interpretations of Title VII that 
deprive victims of discrimination of a remedy.”65  As a result, the Court has 
generally defined the scope of the employment relationship expansively to 
effectuate Congress’s broad remedial purpose.  Hishon v. King & 
Spalding66 and Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.67 are two landmark cases 
illustrating this trend. 
In Hishon, the Court found that a female associate at a law firm could 
bring a Title VII claim after she was denied partnership, even though 
partners of the firm were not employees under Title VII.68  The Court held 
that an employment relationship may be an “informal” one and “arise by the 
simple act of . . . providing a workplace.”69  The “terms, conditions, or 
privileges” of that relationship should be interpreted broadly to ensure 
fairness in employment.70  As a result, the Court found that partnership 
status was a “term, condition, or privilege of employment” because there 
was an implicit agreement that the associate would be considered for 
partnership if she remained in good standing.71 
In Robinson, the Court rejected rigid dictionary definitions to read Title 
VII more expansively.72  The Court found that the word “employed” was 
“not so limited in its possible meanings” as to only include present 
employment.73  The Court expanded the definition of “employee” to 
include current and former employees because such a reading was “more 
consistent with the broader context of Title VII” and allowed “unfettered 
access to [Title VII’s] remedial mechanisms.”74 
The Court has also held that context matters when interpreting 
employment law statutes, finding that they “should be interpreted in context 
rather than just examining their plain meaning.”75  In NLRB v. Hearst 
Publications,76 the Court found that the term employee should: 
not [be] treated by Congress as a word of art having a definite 
meaning . . . . [The term] takes color from its surroundings . . . in the 
statute where it appears, and derives meaning from the context of that 
 
 65. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 178 (1981). 
 66. 467 U.S. 69 (1984). 
 67. 519 U.S. 337 (1997). 
 68. Hishon, 467 U.S. at 76–79. 
 69. Id. at 74. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 76. 
 72. See Robinson, 519 U.S. at 342. 
 73. Id. (rejecting the implicit assumption that “employed” means currently employed). 
 74. Id. at 346. 
 75. Tara Kpere-Daibo, Employment Law—Antidiscrimination—Unpaid and 
Unprotected:  Protecting Our Nation’s Volunteers Through Title VII, 32 U. ARK. LITTLE 
ROCK L. REV. 135, 140 (2009) (quoting NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, 322 U.S. 111, 124 (1944)). 
 76. 322 U.S. 111 (1944). 
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statute, which must be read in the light of the mischief to be corrected and 
the end to be attained.77 
The Court has even extended Title VII’s scope beyond the workplace.  In 
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway, Co. v. White,78 the Court 
expanded the definition of adverse action under Title VII’s antiretaliation 
provision to include acts of retaliation by employers unrelated to the 
workplace.79 
Relying on Congress’s intent to give Title VII a broad remedial purpose, 
several circuit courts have followed the Court and interpreted Title VII 
expansively.80  For example, in Smith v. Castaways Family Diner,81 the 
Seventh Circuit relied in part on the underlying purpose of Title VII to find 
that the husband and the mother of a restaurant owner were employees for 
the purposes of whether the restaurant met the fifteen-employee threshold to 
be considered an employer.82 
However, some circuits, such as the Eighth Circuit, have interpreted Title 
VII less expansively and simply looked at the ordinary meaning of the term 
employee.83  Proponents of this approach base their arguments on 
statements from one of the statute’s initial drafters, who stated that any 
definitional gaps should be given their “common dictionary meaning, 
except as expressly qualified by the act.”84 
B.   Volunteers Today 
This Note explores volunteers, workers on the “borderland” between 
employee and nonemployee.85  This section  defines “volunteers” for the 
purposes of this Note and discusses their role today. 
1.   Who Is a Volunteer? 
Volunteers are an essential part of our society, economy, and 
government.  Webster’s Dictionary defines a volunteer as “one who enters 
into or offers himself for any service of his own free will.”86  Black’s Law 
 
 77. See id. at 124. 
 78. 548 U.S. 53 (2006). 
 79. See id. at 57 (noting the breadth of the provision and its primary goal of unfettered 
access). 
 80. See infra notes 82–84 and accompanying text. 
 81. 453 F.3d 971 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 82. See id. at 987. 
 83. Graves v. Women’s Prof’1 Rodeo Ass’n, 907 F.2d 71, 73 (8th Cir. 1990). 
 84. See 110 CONG. REC. 7188, 7216 (1964); see also Kpere-Daibo, supra note 75, at 
141. 
 85. In NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., Justice Rutledge coined the term “borderland” 
when referring to quasi-employers who are stuck between being an employer and non-
employer. See 322 U.S. 111, 121 (1944).  In Hearst Publications, the Court was asked to 
determine whether a newsboy was an employee under the National Labor Relations Act. See 
id. at 111.  “Few problems in the law have given greater variety of application and conflict in 
results than the cases arising in the borderland between what is clearly an employer-
employee relationship and what is clearly one of independent entrepreneurial dealing.” See 
id. at 121. 
 86. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2564 (1986). 
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Dictionary states that a volunteer is a “voluntary actor or agent in a 
transaction; [especially], a person who, without an employer’s assent and 
without any justification from legitimate personal interest, helps an 
employee in the performance of the employer’s business.”87  Volunteers 
work in our schools, hospitals, police and fire departments, civic and 
political organizations, community service organizations, and non-profit 
organizations.88  They can be found in almost every industry, private and 
public.89  They compose a national volunteer workforce.90  The recent 
economic recession has changed our volunteer workforce such that it not 
only includes “do-gooders” who volunteer for their own pleasure but also 
includes jobseekers who volunteer to secure vital training, much-needed 
compensation, or otherwise expensive insurance and benefits.91 
Given the wide range of individuals who fall into the broad definition of 
volunteer, Professor Mitchell Rubinstein has divided volunteers into two 
subgroups:   “pure volunteer” and “volunteer plus.”92  A “pure volunteer” 
receives nothing in return for his or her services.93  Cases that involve “pure 
volunteers” are easy, and courts have more consistently denied pure 
volunteers coverage under the various employment statutes.94 
A “volunteer plus” receives something in return for his or her services.95  
For example, Juino is a “volunteer plus.”  Although she did not receive a 
salary, Juino received $78 in compensation for responding to thirty-nine 
calls, a life insurance policy, a uniform and badge, and training.96  
Individuals that fall under the “volunteer plus” category are the more 
difficult cases, and courts have struggled to determine whether this 
subgroup is protected under Title VII.97 
 
 87. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1807 (10th ed. 2014). 
 88. See Rubinstein, supra note 19, at 147. 
 89. See id. 
 90. See Kpere-Daibo, supra note 75, at 137. 
For most of us, a volunteer is simply a person who works without pay.  Although 
the term volunteer may bring to mind a “do-gooder” working in a nonprofit or 
social service context, in reality, volunteers participate in virtually every industry 
in our country.  Volunteers can also be students, interns, and trainees, among 
others.  They work in education, government, sales, banking and finance, 
agriculture, medicine, manufacturing, transportation, and more. 
Id. 
 91. As the job market gets smaller, more students are seeking unpaid internships after 
graduating from school. See Rubinstein, supra note 19, at 149.  “In some industries, an 
internship has become a ‘virtual requirement in the scramble to get a foot in the door.’” Id. 
 92. See id. at 153. 
 93. See id. 
 94. See id. at 154. 
 95. See id. at 153. 
 96. See Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire Dist. No. 5, 717 F.3d 431, 439 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 97. See Rubinstein, supra note 19, at 157. 
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2.   What Are the Roles of Volunteers Today? 
Historically, public policy in the United States has strongly valued and 
encouraged volunteerism.98  President Richard Nixon established National 
Volunteer Week, and President Ronald Reagan created the President’s 
Volunteer Award.99  President George H.W. Bush founded a White House 
office and the Points of Light Foundation to promote volunteerism.100  
President Bill Clinton helped establish the Corporation for National Service 
to oversee AmeriCorps and other programs.101  President George W. Bush 
called on Americans to “recognize and celebrate the important work” of 
volunteers.102 
In an environment of budget cuts and government shutdowns, 
volunteerism is even more critical.103  On January 19, 2008, one day before 
his inauguration, President Barack Obama announced a National Day of 
Service, asking Americans to organize and participate in community 
service.104  This has become a tradition for President Obama, who 
organized another National Day of Service on January 19, 2013, the day 
before his second inauguration.105  National Service Days are just one 
element of President Obama’s nationwide service initiative, “United We 
Serve,” which “call[s] on all Americans to participate in our nation’s 
recovery and renewal by serving in our communities.”106 
Scholars have noted that despite our increased reliance on volunteerism, 
efforts to protect volunteers have not increased.107  Some degree of 
uncertainty can be expected given the nontraditional nature of the 
volunteer-employer relationship.  Rubinstein has noted:  “Most of our labor 
and employment laws were drafted with the notion of full time traditional 
employment in mind, which is often no longer the case,”108 and the 
definition of employee “developed from common law tort principles 
involving vicarious liability of employers—not employment law 
dogma.”109 
 
 98. See id. at 148. Over the past few decades, U.S. Presidents have encouraged 
volunteerism. Kpere-Daibo, supra note 75, at 135–36. 
 99. See Kpere-Daibo, supra note 75, at 135. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. See Rubenstein, supra note 19, at 148–49. 
 104. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Calls for Day of Service to Kick Off Inaugural 
Festivities, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2012), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes. 
com/2012/12/06/obama-calls-for-day-of-service-to-kick-off-inaugural-festivities/; see also 
Obama Announces National Day of Service Will Kick Off Inauguration, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Dec. 7, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/06/president-barack-obama-
announces-national-day-of-service_n_2253372.html. 
 105. See Stolberg, supra note 104; see also Obama Announces National Day of Service 
Will Kick Off Inauguration, supra note 104. 
 106. UNITED WE SERVE, http://www.serve.gov (last visited Nov. 26, 2014). 
 107. Kpere-Daibo, supra note 75, at 136. 
 108. Rubinstein, supra note 20, at 609–10. 
 109. Id. at 610. 
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However, employers may have incentives to maintain this ambiguity.  
Employers are in business to earn a profit and may “engag[e] in purposeful 
manipulation in order to avoid a finding of employee status at all costs.”110 
C.   Why Does the Distinction Between Volunteers and Employees Matter? 
The distinction between volunteer and employee is important for several 
reasons.  First, the question of whether volunteers are employees remains of 
paramount concern because Title VII’s protections apply to employees 
only, and courts will not have jurisdiction under Title VII if individuals are 
not deemed employees.111 
Second, uncertainty in the law creates “a breeding ground for 
litigation.”112  And, unlike other areas of the law, volunteers cannot contract 
around the issue.113  Courts are careful to conduct fact-based inquiries 
without relying heavily on the labels that parties place on the work 
relationship.114  Some argue that this is a conscious decision by the courts 
to protect workers with weak bargaining power against employers who may 
try to contract out of the Title VII protections.115 
Third, employment status has significant consequences on eligibility for 
a public pension, collective bargaining agreement, and protections under 
various other state and federal employment laws.116 
Fourth, under Title VII, employer status is heavily dependent upon a 
court’s definition of employee.  To be deemed an employer under Title VII, 
an organization must have at least fifteen employees as statutorily defined 
under Title VII.117  Employers should be able to know their liability in 
advance.118 
Fifth, clarity in the law is essential to prevent abuse.119  Volunteers have 
the potential to be exploited by employers looking for inexpensive labor.120  
A clear definition of employee will help to curb exploitation of a vulnerable 
volunteer workforce.121 
 
 110. Id. at 615. 
 111. See, e.g., Brown v. J. Kaz, Inc., 581 F.3d 175, 181 (3d Cir. 2009) (finding that Title 
VII protections did not extend to the plaintiff because she was not an “employee”). 
 112. Rubinstein, supra note 20, at 609. 
 113. See, e.g., Narayan v. EGL, Inc., 616 F.3d 895, 903–04 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that 
an agreement declaring that an individual is an independent contractor and not an employee 
is not dispositive); Schwieger v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co. of Neb., 207 F.3d 480, 483 (8th Cir. 
2000) (“[A]n employer ‘may not avoid Title VII by affixing a label to a person that does not 
capture the substance of the employment relationship.’” (quoting Devine v. Stone, Leyton & 
Gershman, P.C., 100 F.3d 78, 81 (8th Cir. 1996)));  see also Rubinstein, supra note 20, at 
609. 
 114. Kean, supra note 64, at 177. 
 115. See id. 
 116. See Rubinstein, supra note 20, at 616. 
 117. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2012). 
 118. See Rubinstein, supra note 19, at 150. 
 119. See id. 
 120. See id. at 150–51. 
 121. See id. at 151. 
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Lastly, understanding one’s employment status is also important for self-
identification and personal fulfillment.  Work plays an important role in 
shaping an employee’s identity, and the workplace has gradually become a 
principal site for employees’ social lives.122  William Blackstone famously 
noted that work is one of the “three great relations in private life.”123 
II.   THE CIRCUIT SPLIT:  THE VARIOUS TESTS 
TO DETERMINE EMPLOYMENT STATUS 
Circuit courts are divided with respect to the appropriate test to determine 
whether a volunteer is an employee for the purposes of Title VII.124  The 
Second,125 Fourth,126 Fifth,127 Eighth,128 Tenth,129 and Eleventh130 Circuits 
have adopted a version of the threshold-remuneration test.  However, the 
Sixth131 and Ninth132 Circuits have held that remuneration alone is not 
dispositive and should be should be considered in conjunction with other 
common law agency or economic realities factors. 
This part analyzes the four approaches taken by the circuit courts:   
(1) the threshold-remuneration test, (2) the common law agency test, (3) the 
economic realities test, and (4) the hybrid test.  It also discusses the 
strengths and weaknesses of each approach. 
A.   Threshold-Remuneration Test 
In Juino, the Fifth Circuit joined the Second,133 Fourth,134 Eighth,135 
Tenth,136 and Eleventh137 Circuits by adopting a version of the threshold-
remuneration test, which creates a two-step inquiry to determine whether an 
individual is an employee under Title VII.138  The first step requires the 
plaintiff to show that he or she received direct compensation or substantial 
indirect benefits that are “not merely incidental to the activity 
 
 122. See Zachary A. Kramer, After Work, 95 CAL. L. REV. 627, 645–46 (2007).  In some 
cases, our work and home lives become so reversed that employees organize their social 
lives around their work relationships. Id. at 646. 
 123. Rubinstein, supra note 20, at 608 (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 
*422). 
 124. Rubinstein, supra note 19, at 171. 
 125. See supra note 22. 
 126. See supra note 23. 
 127. See Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire Dist. No. 5, 717 F.3d 431, 434–35 (5th Cir. 
2013). 
 128. See supra note 24. 
 129. See supra note 25. 
 130. See supra note 26. 
 131. See supra note 27. 
 132. See supra note 28. 
 133. See supra note 22. 
 134. See supra note 23. 
 135. See supra note 24. 
 136. See supra note 25. 
 137. See supra note 26. 
 138. See Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire Dist. No. 5, 717 F.3d 431, 435 (5th Cir. 2013); 
O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 115–16 (2d Cir. 1997); Graves v. Women’s Prof’l Rodeo 
Ass’n, 907 F.2d 71, 73–74 (8th Cir. 1990). 
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performed.”139  Direct compensation includes salary and wages.140  Indirect 
benefits include, but are not limited to, disability pensions, survivor’s 
benefits, and group life insurance.141  If direct compensation or substantial 
indirect benefits are shown, the court proceeds to the second step, which 
analyzes the employment relationship under the common law agency or 
economic realities test factors.142 
The leading cases for the threshold-remuneration test are Graves v. 
Women’s Professional Rodeo Ass’n143 and O’Connor v. Davis.144  In 
Graves, the plaintiff, a male rodeo barrel racer, brought a Title VII action 
against the Women’s Professional Rodeo Association (WPRA), alleging 
that it denied him membership on the basis of his gender.145  The Eighth 
Circuit held that a membership list for the WPRA reasonably could not be 
construed as a list of employees primarily because the WPRA members 
were not compensated.146  The court stated that there was an initial 
threshold question of whether an “employment relationship” existed 
“according to the ordinary meaning of the words.”147 
In O’Connor, the Second Circuit held than an unpaid intern was not an 
employee because she received no compensation.148  The Second Circuit 
held that unlike independent contractors, unpaid interns had to first show 
that they were “hired” before the court could engage in a common law 
agency test.149  Since the intern was not compensated, she had not been 
“hired.”150  In both Graves and O’Connor, compensation was a prerequisite 
before any common law agency or economic realities factors could be 
considered.151 
As a result, much of the inquiry turns on what constitutes substantial 
compensation.152  In Haavistola v. Community Fire Company of Rising 
Sun, Inc.,153 the Fourth Circuit explored this issue further.154  A female 
 
 139. See Juino, 717 F.3d at 435; accord O’Connor, 126 F.3d at 115–16; Graves, 907 F.2d 
at 73. 
 140. See Juino, 717 F.3d at 435; accord O’Connor, 126 F.3d at 115–16; Graves, 907 F.2d 
at 73. 
 141. See Juino, 717 F.3d at 437; accord O’Connor, 126 F.3d at 115–16; Graves, 907 F.2d 
at 73. 
 142. See Juino, 717 F.3d at 435; accord O’Connor, 126 F.3d at 115–16; Graves, 907 F.2d 
at 73. 
 143. 907 F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1990). 
 144. 126 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 145. See Graves, 907 F.2d at 71. 
 146. Id. at 74.  The court also found that there was no duty of service to the WPRA or to 
anyone else.  However, this was far less important than the lack of compensation. See id. at 
73. 
 147. Id. at 73. 
 148. See O’Connor, 126 F.3d at 113–15. 
 149. Id. at 115–16. 
 150. Id. 
 151. See id.; Graves, 907 F.2d at 73–74. 
 152. See Pietras v. Bd. of Fire Comm’rs of Farmingville Fire Dist., 180 F.3d 468, 473 (2d 
Cir. 1999) (“[W]e have stated that the question of whether someone is or is not an employee 
under Title VII usually turns on whether he or she has received ‘direct or indirect 
remuneration’ from the alleged employer.” (quoting O’Connor, 126 F.3d at 116)). 
 153. 6 F.3d 211 (4th Cir. 1993). 
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volunteer firefighter brought a gender discrimination claim against her fire 
company.155  Although the plaintiff had received no “direct” compensation, 
the Fourth Circuit found that the district court erred by not allowing the jury 
to determine whether the indirect benefits156 that the plaintiff received were 
significant compensation or merely the “inconsequential incidents of an 
otherwise gratuitous relationship.”157  Haavistola has been interpreted to 
mean that a person can be an employee without receiving a salary or 
paycheck.158  However, scholars have noted that, after Haavistola, it is 
unclear what indirect benefits are sufficient to establish compensation.159 
Proponents of the threshold-remuneration test argue that the common law 
agency and economic realities tests are inappropriate in the volunteer 
context because they were created to differentiate between employees and 
independent contractors,160 not volunteers.  They argue that both employees 
and independent contractors are “hired” parties and, “thus, a prerequisite to 
considering whether an individual is one or the other under common-law 
agency principles is that the individual have been hired in the first 
instance.”161  Proponents of the threshold-remuneration test, therefore, 
argue that the common law agency and economic realities tests are 
inappropriate for the volunteer context because they “ignore[] the 
antecedent question of whether [the putative employee] was hired” by the 
putative employer.162  Proceeding directly to the common law agency or 
economic realities tests assumes facts that have not yet been established. 
Proponents also contend that the threshold-remuneration test is the most 
practical for distinguishing between volunteers and employees because it 
“takes into account the fact that in the least there must be a hiring, as well 
as the fact that the putative employer must control the work of the 
individual in question.”163  It is a comprehensive test that realistically limits 
the universe of potential employees.  Under a broader test, Title VII’s 
protections would extend to a seemingly limitless population, which would 
have significant implications for employment law. 
 
 154. See generally id. 
 155. Id. at 213–14. 
 156. The plaintiff received a disability pension, survivors’ benefits, scholarships for 
dependents upon disability or death, bestowal of state flag upon death in the line of duty, 
Federal Public Safety Officers’ Benefits, insurance coverage, reimbursement for job-related 
expenses, the option to secure a special commemorative registration plate for private 
vehicles without paying extra fees, and the ability to obtain certification as a paramedic. Id. 
at 221. 
 157. Id. at 222. 
 158. Ortner, supra note 63, at 2637. 
 159. Id.  “For example, after Haavistola, a court may consider benefits that ‘create career 
opportunities’ as counting toward the compensation requirement.” Id. at 2638 (quoting Neff 
v. Civil Air Patrol, 916 F. Supp. 710, 713 (S.D. Ohio 1996)). 
 160. See Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire Dist. No. 5, 717 F.3d 431, 435 (5th Cir. 2013); 
see also Ortner, supra note 63, at 2628. 
 161. See Juino, 717 F.3d at 436 (quoting O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 
1997)); see also Ortner, supra note 63, at 2628. 
 162. O’Connor, 126 F.3d at 115. 
 163. Rubinstein, supra note 19, at 179. 
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However, opponents of the threshold-remuneration test cite its 
narrowness and rigidity as reasons for its rejection.  They say our nation’s 
reliance on volunteers necessitates a more expansive definition of 
employee,164 because volunteers are an essential part of our society, 
economy, and government.165  Some scholars believe that “there is a 
movement away from employees having long-term, established 
relationships with their employers in favor of a more short-term contingent 
relationship. . . .  [R]elationships will be increasingly atypical and will not 
involve a direct employer-employee relationship.”166  They maintain the 
rigidity of the threshold-remuneration test will not allow Title VII to adapt 
to the changing nature of our workforce. 
Opponents argue that the threshold-remuneration test is at odds with 
Congress’s broad remedial purpose.167  As seen in Robinson and Hishon, 
the Supreme Court has adopted expansive definitions of the employment 
relationship to effectuate the intent of Congress.168  Furthermore, Title VII 
was meant “to protect employees with little bargaining power,”169 such as 
volunteers. 
Opponents also assert that the threshold-remuneration test does not 
comport with Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden,170 which held 
that the common law agency test is the default standard when Congress has 
been silent on the appropriate one.171  Courts that employ the threshold-
remuneration test argue that the Court’s use of the term “hired party” in 
Darden necessitates an antecedent question of whether parties are in fact 
“hired” before proceeding to the common law agency test.172  In the case of 
volunteers, they hold that hiring is determined by compensation.173 
However, courts, such as the Sixth Circuit, have rejected this 
argument.174  In Bryson v. Middlefield Volunteer Fire Department,175 the 
Sixth Circuit stated that “[t]he Supreme Court included the term ‘hired 
party’ in Darden only in a direct quote from its decision in [Community for 
Creative Non-Violence v. Reid],176 and the Reid Court’s use of ‘hired party’ 
was in the context of the ‘work for hire’ provision from the Copyright 
 
 164. See discussion supra Part I.B.1. 
 165. See discussion supra Part I.B.2. 
 166. Rubinstein, supra note 20, at 640–41. 
 167. Congress intended for Title VII to grant all individuals the right to be employed 
without discrimination. H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, at 26 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2355, 2391, 2401.  Title VII “was enacted for the sole purpose of eliminating 
discrimination.” Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1340 (6th Cir. 1983). 
 168. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 344–45 (1997); Hishon v. King & 
Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 74 (1984). 
 169. Kean, supra note 64, at 166. 
 170. 503 U.S. 318 (1992). 
 171. Id. 
 172. See, e.g., O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 1997); see also supra notes 
161–62162 and accompanying text. 
 173. See supra notes 146–60 and accompanying text. 
 174. See Bryson, 656 F.3d at 354 (finding that remuneration is only one dispositive factor 
and not an independent antecedent requirement). 
 175. 656 F.3d 348 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 176. 490 U.S. 730 (1989). 
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Act.”177  Therefore, the Darden Court’s use of the term “hired party” was 
not a conscious decision to create an antecedent question of whether the 
parties were “hired” before proceeding to the common law agency test.178  
“The [Supreme] Court’s instruction to apply the common law of agency is 
not limited to when the individual receives significant remuneration but 
rather ‘when Congress has used the term “employee” without defining 
it.’”179  Therefore, since employee has not been adequately defined by 
Congress, courts such as the Sixth Circuits have employed the common law 
agency test as stated in Darden. 
Lastly, opponents assert that the threshold-remuneration test lacks clarity 
as to what constitutes adequate compensation.180  Under the threshold-
remuneration test, the existence of an employment relationship ultimately 
turns on whether there is adequate compensation.181  The issue of 
compensation is straightforward when there is a paycheck or salary; 
however, things become much less clear when a plaintiff alleges an 
employment relationship based on the receipt of indirect benefits. 
This ambiguity has led to inconsistencies.  For example, in Pietras v. 
Board of Fire Commissioners,182 the Second Circuit found that a volunteer 
firewoman could be an employee under Title VII because she received 
insurance retirement benefits.183  However, in Juino, the Second Circuit 
found that that insurance and retirement benefits were not sufficient in a 
similar volunteer firefighter context.184 
Some courts have sought to clarify “indirect benefits” by requiring some 
sort of economic reward in connection with indirect benefits.185  For 
example, the Tenth Circuit found that a medical student was not an 
employee of the school because his education alone did not satisfy the 
remuneration requirement.186  Similarly, the Eighth Circuit held that a 
graduate researcher was not an employee because the research the plaintiff 
obtained for her dissertation was not compensation.187  Regardless, 
however, scholars note that there is a lack of clarity as to what constitutes 
 
 177. Bryson, 656 F.3d at 354. 
Although the [Supreme] Court did not define “hired party” in Reid, it did define  
“hiring party”:  “By ‘hiring party,’ we mean to refer to the party who claims 
ownership of the copyright by virtue of the work for hire doctrine.”  We doubt that 
the [Supreme] Court would define “hiring party” as such while at the same time 
considering ‘hired party’ to carry much more substantive weight in requiring that it 
be an individual who received significant remuneration for his services. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 178. See id. 
 179. Id. at 354 (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739–40 
(1989)). 
 180. See discussion supra note 159. 
 181. See supra note 152; see also Haavistola v. Cmty. Fire Co. of Rising Sun, Inc., 6 F.3d 
211, 221–22 (4th Cir. 1993). 
 182. 180 F.3d 468 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 183. See id. at 473. 
 184. See Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire Dist. No. 5, 717 F.3d 431, 439 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 185. Kean, supra note 64, at 178. 
 186. See McGuinness v. Univ. of N.M. Sch. Of Med., 170 F.3d 974, 979 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 187. See Jacob-Mua v. Veneman, 289 F.3d 517, 521 (8th Cir. 2002). 
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substantial compensation,188 creating unknowable variables in the law that 
disadvantage workers.189 
B.   Common Law Agency Test 
The common law agency test assesses “the extent to which the one for 
whom the work is being done has the right to control the details and the 
means by which the work is to be performed.”190  Courts have employed 
this test under “the conventional master-servant relationship as understood 
by common-law agency doctrine.”191  “Control” is a relative factor “judged 
not by its actual exercise but rather by the employer’s authority to use it.”192  
Traditionally, this approach has been used to determine whether a party is 
an employee or an independent contractor.193 
Under the common law agency test no single factor is determinative.194  
Remuneration is not an independent antecedent requirement but one of 
many factors that should be considered with “all of the incidents of the 
relationship.”195  However, the right to control is given significant 
weight.196 
The two landmark Supreme Court cases are Reid and Darden.  In Reid, 
the Court articulated the common law agency test to determine whether a 
sculptor was an employee or an independent contractor.197  The Court 
considered “the hiring party’s right to control the manner and means by 
which the product is accomplished” and identified the following factors: 
[1] the skill required; [2] the source of the instrumentalities and tools; [3] 
the location of the work; [4] the duration of the relationship between the 
parties; [5] whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional 
projects to the hired party; [6] the extent of the hired party’s discretion 
over when and how long to work; [7] the method of payment; [8] the 
hired party’s role in hiring and paying assistants; [9] whether the work is 
part of the regular business of the hiring party; [10] whether the hiring 
party is in business; [11] the provision of employee benefits; and [12] the 
tax treatment of the hired party.198 
Courts have noted that these Reid factors are not exclusive and other 
factors may be considered.199  Interestingly, in footnote eight, the Court 
 
 188. See supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
 189. The lack of clarity in the law leaves volunteers open to potential abuse. See 
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 190. Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire Dist. No. 5, 717 F.3d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 2013) 
(quoting Mares v. Marsh, 777 F.2d 1066, 1067 (5th Cir. 1985)). 
 191. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322–23 (1992). 
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 193. See Juino, 717 F.3d at 435. 
 194. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751–52 (1989). 
 195. Darden, 503 U.S. at 324; see also Bryson v. Middlefield Volunteer Fire Dep’t, Inc., 
656 F.3d 348, 354 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 196. See Reid, 490 U.S. at 752. 
 197. Id. at 752–53. 
 198. Id. at 751–52. 
 199. See Fichman v. Media Ctr., 512 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The [Supreme] 
Court noted that these factors were not exhaustive, and that whether an individual is an 
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expressly rejected the suggestion that the term employee refers only to 
formal, salaried employees.200 
In Darden, the Court reaffirmed the Reid factors201 and held that the 
common law agency test should be used where the statute does not clearly 
define a term.202  The Court stated:  “When Congress has used the term 
‘employee’ without defining it, we have concluded that Congress intended 
to describe the conventional master-servant relationship as understood by 
common-law agency doctrine.”203  The Court continued:  “In determining 
whether a hired party is an employee under the general common law of 
agency, we consider the hiring party’s right to control the manner and 
means by which the product is accomplished.”204 
Proponents of the common law agency test generally cite Darden as 
justification, arguing that it set the common law agency test as the default 
standard when Congress has not specified an appropriate standard.205  For 
example, in Bryson, the Sixth Circuit held that “the Court’s instruction to 
apply the common law of agency is not limited to when the individual 
receives significant remuneration but rather ‘when Congress has used the 
term “employee” without defining it.’”206 
In Darden, the Court recognized that courts had struggled with finding 
the appropriate definition of employee and tried to provide some clarity.207  
In fact, the Darden Court rejected its prior holdings in NLRB v. Hearst 
Publications and United States v. Silk,208 in which the Court had applied a 
version of the economic realities test.209  In Walters v. Metropolitan 
Educational Enterprises, Inc.,210 the Court again suggested that the 
common law agency test would be the appropriate test to apply to 
determine whether an individual is an employee under Title VII.211 
 
employee depends on ‘all of the incidents of the relationship[,] with no one factor being 
decisive.’” (quoting Darden, 503 U.S. at 324)); accord Rubinstein, supra note 19, at 618. 
 200. Reid, 490 U.S. at 742 n.8. 
 201. Darden, 503 U.S. at 323–24 (quoting Reid, 490 U.S. at 751–52). 
 202. Id. at 323. 
 203. Id. at 322–23. 
 204. See id. at 323–24 (quoting Reid, 490 U.S. at 751–52). 
 205. See, e.g., Bryson v. Middlefield Volunteer Fire Dep’t, Inc., 656 F.3d 348, 354 (6th 
Cir. 2011) (quoting Reid, 490 U.S. at 739–40); see also Kean, supra note 64, at 185 (“Recent 
Supreme Court decisions make it clear that the Supreme Court believes that the common-law 
agency test is the appropriate test to apply in situations like Title VII where the statute does 
not provide [adequate] guidance . . . .”). 
 206. Bryson, 656 F.3d at 354 (quoting Reid, 490 U.S. at 739–40).  The Bryson court 
dismissed any meaning in the Supreme Court’s use of the term “hired party,” stating that it 
resulted from the Court lifting a direct quote from Reid, which discussed the “work for hire” 
provision from the Copyright Act. Id. 
 207. See Darden, 503 U.S. at 322–23 (“[W]hen Congress has used the term ‘employee’ 
without defining it, we have concluded that Congress intended to describe the conventional 
master-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine.”). 
 208. 331 U.S. 704 (1947). 
 209. Darden, 503 U.S. at 325. 
 210. 519 U.S. 202 (1997). 
 211. See id. at 211. 
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Opponents argue that the common law agency test is too “mechanistic” 
in its analysis and focuses only on the extent of the authority to control.212  
They contend that this test is limiting because it does not fully consider the 
extent of the individual’s dependence on the putative employer.213  
Opponents also assert that the common law agency test is inappropriate for 
the volunteer context given that the common law agency test has been 
traditionally used when determining whether an individual is an employee 
or an independent contractor.214 
C.   Economic Realities Test 
The economic realities test was first articulated by the Supreme Court in 
Bartels v. Birmingham,215 a case in which the Court had to determine 
whether an individual was an independent contractor for purposes of 
payment of social security taxes.216  The Court stated that “[o]bviously 
control is characteristically associated with the employer-employee 
relationship but in the application of social legislation employees are those 
who as a matter of economic reality are dependent upon the business to 
which they render service.”217 
The Sixth Circuit first introduced the economic realities test into the Title 
VII context to determine employee status in Armbruster v. Quinn.218  The 
court held that the manufacturer’s representatives—who did not work in the 
defendant’s corporate office, did not exclusively sell the defendant’s 
product lines, and received no salary other than commissions—could be 
construed as employees under Title VII.219  Rejecting that the term 
employee was meant “in a technical sense,” the court held that the correct 
test to determine employment status was one that examined the “economic 
realities underlying the relationship between the individual and so-called 
principal in an effort to determine whether that individual is likely to be 
susceptible to the discriminatory practices which the act was designed to 
eliminate.”220 
In contrast with the common law agency test, the economic realities test 
examines the extent to which the putative employee is dependent, as a 
matter of economic reality, on the services that he or she is rendering to the 
putative employer.221  The Ninth Circuit identified the following factors to 
be considered: 
(1) the degree of the alleged employer’s right to control the manner in 
which the work is to be performed; (2) the alleged employee’s 
 
 212. Ortner, supra note 63, at 2628. 
 213. Id. 
 214. See Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire Dist. No. 5, 717 F.3d 431, 435 (5th Cir. 2013); 
see also Ortner, supra note 63, at 2628. 
 215. 332 U.S. 126 (1947). 
 216. See id. at 126. 
 217. See id. at 130. 
 218. 711 F.2d 1332 (6th Cir. 1983). 
 219. See id. at 1339. 
 220. Id. at 1340. 
 221. See Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire Dist. No. 5, 717 F.3d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 2013). 
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opportunity for profit or loss depending on his managerial skill; (3) the 
alleged employee’s investment in equipment or materials required for his 
task, or his employment of helpers; (4) whether the service rendered 
requires a special skill; (5) the degree of permanence of the working 
relationship; and (6) whether the service rendered is an integral part of the 
alleged employer’s business.222 
It is important to note that the economic realities test is not limited to 
cash benefits only.223  For example, in Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation v. 
Secretary of Labor,224 the Court used the economic realities test to 
determine that volunteers who were not given cash salaries but did receive 
food, clothing, shelter, and other benefits were employees for the purpose 
of the Fair Labor Standards Act.225  The Court found that the volunteers 
were employees in part because they expected to receive in-kind benefits in 
exchange for their services.226 
The economic realities factors are very similar to the common law 
agency factors, as both tests ultimately measure the extent of the control, be 
it economic or some other form of control, the employer has over the 
employee.  The very first factor to be considered is the right to control, 
which is the cornerstone of the common law agency test.227  As a result, 
opponents argue that the economic realities test is just a rearticulation of the 
common law agency test.228 
However, proponents contend that the economic realities test is a more 
expansive version of the common law agency test and, therefore, provides a 
unique approach.229  Rubinstein states that the “economic reality test 
developed because of the narrow focus of the common law test on the 
standard of control.”230  Other scholars have also cited the economic 
realities test as an attempt by the court to broaden the analysis.231 
For example, in Armbruster, the Sixth Circuit adopted the economic 
realities test because it rejected a technical interpretation of “employee”232 
and allowed the court to more fully consider the underlying employment 
relationship to determine “whether that individual is likely to be susceptible 
to the discriminatory [employment] practices.”233  The economic realities 
test was intended to be a more flexible definition that eschewed 
technicalities and focused on the vulnerability of the individual, as 
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 225. See id. at 301–02. 
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 227. See Rubinstein, supra note 20, at 626. 
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 233. Id. at 1340. 
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evidenced by his or her economic dependency on the putative employer.234  
One scholar has noted that the “‘economic realities’ analysis offers the 
advantages of ‘avoid[ing] the rigidity of the common law test 
and . . . accommodat[ing] the present range of employment relationships 
and the new patterns that may evolve in the future.’”235 
Opponents argue that the economic realities test “fails to provide a clear, 
workable standard for defining employee status.”236  The “vague 
requirement that employees be vulnerable to the kind of employment 
practices that Title VII was intended to prevent” extends Title VII’s breadth 
enormously.237 
Lastly, some opponents reject the economic realities test in light of the 
statement in Darden, which indicated that the common law agency test is 
the default standard when Congress has not specified an appropriate 
standard.238  However, proponents of the economic realities test, such as the 
Ninth Circuit, rebut this argument because the Darden Court noted that the 
Reid factors were not exhaustive and that employment relationship depends 
on “all of the incidents of the [employment] relationship with no one factor 
being decisive.”239 
D.   Hybrid Test 
In an attempt to find a middle ground,240 the hybrid test combines both 
the common law and economic reality tests.  By incorporating the economic 
realities factors, the hybrid test was meant to offer a more expansive 
alternative to the common law agency test.241  However, courts still heavily 
rely on the common law “right to control” analysis,242 and the right to 
control an employee’s conduct is the most significant part of the test.243 
The hybrid test was first adopted by the District of Columbia Circuit in 
Spirides v. Reinhardt.244  Under this test, “it is the economic realities of the 
relationship viewed in light of the common law principles of agency and the 
right of the employer to control the employee that are determinative.”245  
When determining the extent of control, the hybrid test examines “whether 
the alleged employer has the right to hire and fire the employee, the right to 
supervise the employee, and the right to set the employee’s work 
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 235. Ortner, supra note 63, at 2630. 
 236. Id. 
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 243. See Deal v. State Farm Cnty. Mutual Ins. Co. of Tex., 5 F.3d 117, 119 (5th Cir. 
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schedule.”246  The economic realities component of the test has focused on 
“whether the alleged employer paid the employee’s salary, withheld taxes, 
provided benefits, and set the terms and conditions of employment.”247  
Additional factors such as the “intention of the parties” are also 
considered.248 
The economic realities portion of the hybrid test is not limited to cash 
benefits only.249  In Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of 
Labor, the Court found that the volunteers were employees in part because 
they expected to receive in-kind benefits in exchange for their services.250 
Scholars have noted that the hybrid test is popular and many courts have 
chosen to apply it.251  Proponents state that it offers the best of both 
worlds.252  It incorporates the advantages of the economic realities test,253 
which is more flexible and expansive, while still maintaining the right to 
control analysis.254 
However, opponents argue that the hybrid test is inappropriate in light of 
Darden, which indicated that the common law agency test is the default 
standard when Congress has not specified an appropriate standard.255  
However, proponents reject this argument on the grounds that the Darden 
Court never stated that the Reid factors were not exhaustive.256  In fact, the 
Darden Court stated that the employment relationship depends on “all of 
the incidents of the employment relationship with no one factor being 
decisive.”257  The hybrid test maintains the Darden right to control analysis 
and merely expands upon it by allowing courts to consider the economic 
realities of the employment relationship in light of the common law 
principles.258 
Lastly, opponents criticize the hybrid test as another rearticulation of the 
common law agency test.259  For example, the Second Circuit has stated 
that there is “little discernable difference between the hybrid test and the 
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common law agency test.”260  The court continued: “Both place their 
greatest emphasis on the hiring party’s right to control the manner and 
means by which the work is accomplished and consider a nonexhaustive list 
of factors as part of a flexible analysis of the ‘totality of the 
circumstances.’”261  The Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have made 
similar observations.262 
III.   THE PUBLIC HEALTH EFFECTS OF WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION 
Given that courts have used the common law agency, economic realities, 
and hybrid tests interchangeably and scholars contend that the latter two 
tests are derivations of the common law agency test,263 the main question is 
whether courts should adopt the threshold-remuneration test or some form 
of the common law agency test. 
It is well established that Title VII has a broad purpose.264  It not only 
remediates prior harm but also protects the public welfare by deterring 
future discriminatory conduct.265  Therefore, when defining the scope of 
Title VII, courts must consider how it will affect Title VII’s ability to 
protect the public welfare.  In doing so, courts must explore the full extent 
of the injury caused by discrimination, beyond just the targeted individual.  
How does discrimination affect non-targeted coworkers who are forced to 
work in toxic environments?  How does it affect families, the health of the 
business, and society at large? 
This part examines the public health implications of workplace 
discrimination.  Part III.A discusses the health effects of discrimination on 
the entire workplace, including non-targeted coworkers who are injured by 
witnessing or merely perceiving discrimination.  Part III.B reviews the 
effects of workplace discrimination on familial health.  Part III.C considers 
the effects of workplace discrimination on civic society.  Lastly, Part III.D 
explores the effects of workplace discrimination on employer health. 
A.   Coworker Health:  The Effects of Discrimination 
on the Entire Workforce 
It is well established that targeted victims of discrimination often suffer 
trauma that manifests in physical and psychological harm.266  However, the 
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health consequences of discrimination extend across the workplace beyond 
the targeted individual.267 
This section examines the health effects of discrimination on bystanders.  
It then explores the effects of mere perceptions of discrimination in the 
workplace.  Lastly, it examines the degree to which group-based identities 
increase vulnerabilities. 
1.   Health Effects on Bystanders 
Studies have shown that bystanders—those individuals who are not 
directly targeted by discrimination but share a workplace with the targeted 
individual and witness the discrimination—may suffer harm to an equal or 
greater degree than those who have been victims.268  Bystanders often 
express a loss of belief in justice and a caring community,269 as well as 
anxiety, overall poor health, and pain.270 
Professor Richard Sorenson and his colleagues examined the extent to 
which sexual harassment affects bystanders.271  The study exposed a female 
participant population to a series of vignettes, which consisted of four 
sexually harassing incidents:   (1) a non-harassing greeting, (2) unwanted 
repeated requests for a date, (3) unwanted repeated requests for an affair, 
and (4) unwanted sexualized touch.272  Each participant was randomly 
assigned to either a direct victim perspective or bystander perspective.273 
The study found that sexual harassment is an “emotionally devastating 
event” for bystanders, as well as direct victims.274  Both groups reported 
significant negative effects, including depression, loss of motivation, and 
adoption of work-related coping strategies.275  Interestingly, there was no 
statistically significant difference in negative effects between direct victims 
and bystanders.276  The study concluded that the effects of discrimination 
are felt across the workforce, resulting in a loss of productivity, decreased 
worker satisfaction, and increased turnover.277 
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Other studies have also shown that “non-targeted witnesses of workplace 
injustice may also be at risk for adverse health outcomes.”278  Witnesses of 
workplace bullying have reported increased anxiety279 and acute pain.280  
Witnessing sexual harassment resulted in lower job satisfaction and 
psychological health in a study of female workers.281  Another study 
correlated witnessing mistreatment with poor psychological health.282  
Therefore, coworkers who witness discrimination are at risk of significant 
physical and emotional harm. 
2.   Health Effects Caused by Mere Perceptions of Discrimination 
A coworker does not need to witness discrimination to suffer harm.  
Studies have shown that mere perceptions of discrimination negatively 
impact the health of employees.283  Perceptions of discrimination are 
influenced by job attitudes, including work satisfaction, prior experiences of 
discrimination, and overall work contexts.284  One study warned that 
perceptions create significant physical and emotional costs that should not 
be trivialized.285 
Another study estimated that, each year, two million individuals leave 
their jobs due to perceptions of an unfair working environment caused by 
daily events such as “small comments, whispered jokes, and not-so-funny 
emails.”286  Perceptions of “unfairness, in the form of every-day 
inappropriate behaviors . . . is a very real, prevalent and damaging part of 
the work environment.”287 
As a result, the discussion is no longer limited to the effects of overt, 
targeted discrimination on a particular individual; subtle perceptions can 
lead to negative consequences.288  Discrimination is a problem of subtle 
bias creeping into the everyday.289  No worker is totally immune to 
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discrimination because many aspects of discrimination are rooted in daily 
interactions, take many forms, and have many sources.290 
3.   Group-Based Identities 
Potential for harm may increase if the non-targeted coworker shares a 
group-based identity with the targeted individual.  Professor Catherine Fisk 
has noted that “[t]he development of any group-based identity is rooted in 
both positive and negative identifications with one’s group.”291  An attack 
on an individual member of the group may be internalized as a threat to the 
entire group.  Psychological studies have shown a particular vulnerability of 
women and minorities due to group-based identities.292  For example, if a 
male manager harasses a female employee with sexually harassing remarks 
and then fires her based on her gender, other women in the workplace may 
feel threatened by this male manager.  They may feel that, as women, they 
are potential targets of discrimination and so internalize the fear and harm, 
even if they are not the direct targets. 
This is particularly harmful because there is an “extraordinary 
destructiveness of being shamed for one’s very identity.”293  Therefore, 
discriminatory conduct threatens the health of individuals who share group-
based identities with the targeted individual. 
B.   Familial Health:  The Effects of Workplace Discrimination on Families 
The extent of the injury caused by discrimination is not limited to the 
workplace.294  “[W]ork experiences linger with [employees] long after they 
leave the workplace and color their interactions with their families.”295  As 
a result, families suffer harm in the wake of workplace discrimination.296 
Families function like a system, an interconnected unit.297  Each family 
has a careful balance of assigned roles and duties within this unit.298  For 
example, Partner A grocery shops every Sunday for the upcoming week.  
Partner B is responsible for cooking dinner each night.  Child A sets the 
table each night, and Child B takes out the trash every evening.  While this 
example may be a bit idealistic and oversimplistic, it illustrates the 
interconnectedness of families.  When one family member is burdened, the 
balance is disturbed and another family member must pick up the slack.299 
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Negative health effects of workplace discrimination are shared through 
familial interactions and communication.300  One method has been 
characterized as the “kick the dog” phenomenon, in which an abused 
employee, knowingly or unknowingly, undermines the family when he or 
she is at home.301  In one study, a mother stated: 
[T]he anger sometimes builds up, and you’re not even aware that it’s 
there—so the moment your spouse, or your child, if there is anything that 
may seem like it was belittling or demeaning, you’re responding to them 
with a level of anger, even, that is really inappropriate for the situation.302 
Another respondent stated that “the pressure at work drains them mentally 
to the point that when they go home they are unable to deal with their 
children or partners in an effective and loving way.”303 
The stress and depression can also cross over onto other family members.  
One study of Mexican-American families found that male employees’ 
reports of workplace racism directly correlated with depressive symptoms 
for both them and their wives.304  The effects of discrimination can 
manifest into feelings of alienation, disconnectedness, and overburdening 
among family members.305 
Professor Zachary Kramer refers to this as “exporting.”306  Employees 
“export” the effects of discrimination to their families by taking both the 
substance of their work and their social interactions with coworkers out of 
the workplace and into their private lives (and vice versa).307  Kramer 
categorizes the harm experienced by families in two ways:  disruption harm 
and exclusion harm.308  Disruption harm occurs when employees bring the 
effects of workplace discrimination home with them and, consequently, are 
unable to participate productively in family life.309  For example, children 
are harmed when a distraught employee is too stressed to play or help with 
school work.310  The employee might seek support and consolation from the 
partner, overburdening and creating tension in the relationship.311  The 
child may try to cope by taking on additional responsibilities at home.312  
Children are particularly vulnerable because they have a more difficult time 
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understanding discrimination and rationalizing the reason for the 
employees’ behavior.313 
Exclusion harm occurs when employees try to shield their families from 
workplace discrimination by keeping their work and private lives 
separate.314  When employees exclude partners from their work lives, they 
are alienating their partners from an important part of their lives.315  
Children may experience harm in the form of mixed messages about the 
value and role of work.  “[A]n important part of parenting involves teaching 
children about work, which includes instilling in them a strong work ethic 
and an appreciation of the value of work.”316 
Therefore, the effects of workplace discrimination impact the home.  
Discrimination threatens the health of the employee, as well as their 
partners and children. 
C.   Civic Health:  The Effects of Workplace Discrimination 
on Civil Society 
If public engagement and societal integration are essential components of 
modern society, then courts have an interest in ensuring that workplaces are 
cooperative environments that promote, rather than discourage, engagement 
and integration.317  This section explores arguments that workplace 
discrimination imposes citizenship harm and depletes social capital.  It 
discusses the role of Title VII in setting the public discourse on workplace 
discrimination. 
1.   Citizenship Harm:  The Workplace As a Forum for Public Discourse 
Public discourse is essential for legitimate self-governance.318  Public 
discourse serves as a medium of social integration through which diverse 
members of a democratic society can form a cohesive citizenry.319  
Everyday citizens participate in public discourse through civic 
engagement.320  However, civic engagement is declining as more 
Americans “bowl alone.”321 
 
 313. Id. at 647. 
 314. Id. at 628.  As a result, families are deprived of the social, emotional, and political 
benefits associated with work. Id. 
 315. Id. at 645–47.  Work plays an important role in shaping an employee’s identity, and 
the workplace has gradually become a principal site for employees’ social lives. Id.  
According to the author, in some cases, our work and home lives become so reversed that 
employees organize their social lives around their work relationships. Id. at 646. 
 316. Id. at 648. 
 317. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together:  The Workplace, Civil Society, and the 
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 1, 86 (2001). 
 318. See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE:  THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF 
AMERICAN COMMUNITY 338–40 (2000). 
 319. Id. 
 320. Id. 
 321. See id. at 303. 
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Some scholars blame this decline on the increasing demands of the 
workplace.  However, as traditional forms of public life have waned,322 the 
workplace has actually emerged as an essential forum for public 
discourse.323  The workplace is “where we learn about each other, work 
together, and exchange social and political views.”324  Work enables 
Americans to satisfy the basic preconditions of civic participation that was 
once fulfilled through traditional public forums.325 
Given the importance of the workplace in democratic life, employers 
who exclude individuals from the workplace or discriminate therein “inflict 
citizenship harm on those individuals by diminishing their ability to 
participate in one of the most important forums affecting public life.”326  
Such “citizenship harm” places a greater burden on the law to intervene and 
protect those individuals.327 
2.   Depletion of Social Capital:  The Workplace As a Tool 
for Civic Integration and Social Equality 
Scholars contend that the workplace is also a progressive tool for civic 
integration and societal equality.328  Modern society depends upon our 
“social capital”—“networks, norms, and trust . . . that enable participants to 
act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives.”329  The 
workplace is a potentially transformative source of such capital.330 
Work plays an integral role not only in how we understand ourselves but 
also in how we perceive our society and interact with others.  “Given the 
patterns of residential and educational segregation in this nation, for many 
Americans work provides the only opportunity to learn from and about 
people different from themselves.”331 
Professor Cynthia Estlund examined the tremendous influence that work 
can have on civic society.332  She noted that “[t]he workplace is the single 
most important site of cooperative interaction and sociability among adult 
citizens outside the family.”333  She found that “workplace interactions 
among coworkers—former strangers from different families, 
neighborhoods, backgrounds—can help to foster an ephemeral but essential 
 
 322. Putnam argues that Americans are “devoting less time to voluntary organizations” 
that are traditional forms of public life that were essential to effective and legitimate 
democratic self-governance. Id. 
 323. See Eddie A. Jauregui, The Citizenship Harms of Workplace Discrimination, 40 
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 347, 348 (2007). 
 324. Id. 
 325. Id. 
 326. Id. at 348–49. 
 327. Id. at 349. 
 328. See generally Estlund, supra note 317. 
 329. PUTNAM, supra note 318, at 48–64; see Estlund, supra note 317, at 1. 
 330. See Estlund, supra note 317, at 2. 
 331. Jauregui, supra note 323, at 361. 
 332. Estlund, supra note 317, at 3–4. 
 333. Id. 
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sense of connectedness among citizens, of ‘being in this together,’ in a 
complex and heterogeneous democratic society.”334 
Coming together and sharing a physical space in a cooperative work 
environment can transform attitudes on divisive issues such as race and 
sex.335  When employees leave work, they share their new attitudes with 
their family and communities.336  The workplace is, therefore, an important 
tool for exporting progressive values and building new relationships among 
communities. 
Estlund focuses on the positive power of the workplace.337  However, the 
necessary precondition to Estlund’s thesis is a cooperative work 
environment.338  Workplaces can easily become environments of hierarchy, 
coercion, and harassment.339  “When the workplace also functions as a 
cultural or social force . . . the implications of workplace hierarchy and 
exclusion can take on greater meaning.”340  Victims and bystanders of such 
discrimination feel “a loss of belief in justice and a caring community.”341  
Workplaces can breed civil discord just as easily as they can foster civil 
harmony. 
3.   Invisible Harm:  Setting Public Discourse on Workplace Discrimination 
Basic civil rights violations are a matter of public concern.342  Title VII is 
not only an important remedial tool for victims of abuse, it is also a way of 
keeping a public record of workplace discrimination, which informs the 
public discourse.343 
Over the past twenty-five years, there has been a public perception that 
discrimination in the workplace is largely a thing of the past.344  In fact, 
studies have shown a latent judicial bias against plaintiffs in employment 
claims.345  Despite the increase in employment litigation, plaintiffs are 
unlikely to succeed when compared with other federal claims.346 
Title VII protections are necessary not only to inform the public but also 
to deter future discriminatory conduct.  Employment legislation was meant 
to facilitate discrimination claims so that discrimination would be brought 
to light in a public forum and remedial mechanisms would deter employers 
from similar conduct.347 
 
 334. Id. at 4. 
 335. Kramer, supra note 122, at 633. 
 336. Id. 
 337. See generally Estlund, supra note 317. 
 338. See generally id. 
 339. Id. at 5. 
 340. Jauregui, supra note 323, at 362. 
 341. See Sherer, supra note 269, at 2135. 
 342. Minna J. Kotkin, Secrecy in Context:  The Shadowy Life of Civil Rights Litigation, 
81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 571, 572 (2006). 
 343. See id. at 571–75. 
 344. Id. at 572. 
 345. Kotkin, supra note 265, at 931–32. 
 346. Id.; see also Kotkin, supra note 342, at 573. 
 347. Kotkin, supra note 265, at 930; see also Kotkin, supra note 342, at 575. 
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As a result, Professor Minna Kotkin argues that secrecy skews the public 
discourse on workplace discrimination against workers.348  And, when 
workplace discrimination is not “brought to light in a public forum,” an 
important form of deterrence is lost.349 
D.   Employer Health:  The Effects of Workplace Discrimination 
on the Employer 
Discrimination also jeopardizes the health of the business or 
organization.  Studies have shown that discrimination continues to be a 
widespread problem with significant consequences not only for the victim 
but also for the organization.350  Discrimination fosters toxic work 
environments, which lead to a loss of productivity, decreased worker 
satisfaction, increased turnover, and legal penalties.351  Workplace 
discrimination undercuts productivity, morale, and loyalty.352  
Discrimination can also increase health-based costs (e.g., employee health 
insurance and worker’s compensation), as employees seek remedies for the 
physical and emotional effects of discrimination.353 
Discrimination harms retention, which is important to a company’s 
financial strength and competitive edge.354  One study found that two 
million individuals leave their jobs due to cumulative daily interactions that 
create a discriminatory or unfair workplace.355  Witnesses to bullying are 
negatively affected and 20 percent of them decide to leave the organization 
as a result of their experience.356  Turnover is expensive,357 and employers 
risk losing their best and brightest. 
Discrimination also results in significant reputational costs.358  
Employees who leave jobs due to unfairness later discourage potential 
customers and job applicants from working with their former employers.359  
In a modern digital world, a disgruntled employee’s negative experiences 
can be communicated to millions of customers and employees within 
seconds.  A single voice can have a major impact, especially when it 
involves critical issues such as race and sex. 
 
 348. Kotkin, supra note 265, at 931; see also Kotkin, supra note 342, at 573. 
 349. Kotkin, supra note 265, at 930; see also Kotkin, supra note 342, at 575. 
 350. Sorenson et al., supra note 271, at 458. 
 351. Id. at 491; see also Margaret H. Vickers, Towards Employee Wellness:  Rethinking 
Bullying Paradoxes and Masks, 18 EMP. RESPS. & RTS. J. 267, 267 (2006) (“There can be no 
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employees.”). 
 352. Vickers, supra note 351, at 269. 
 353. Crosby Burns, The Costly Business of Discrimination, CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS 
2–3 (2012), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/lgbt/report/2012/03/22/11234/the-
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 354. See id. 
 355. LEVEL PLAYING FIELD INST., supra note 286, at 4. 
 356. Vickers, supra note 351, at 269. 
 357. See Burns, supra note 353, at 2–3. 
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In short, workplace discrimination is costly.360  One study found that the 
annual cost of employees who leave due to perceived “unfairness” exceeds 
the cumulative settlements for all sex- and race-based lawsuits reported by 
the EEOC from 1997 to 2006.361  In 2006, this perceived unfairness cost 
U.S. employers $64 billion on an annual basis.362  “There can be no health 
or wellness in organizations without careful attention to the well-being of 
individual employees.”363  Discrimination puts the health of the business 
and the job of each employee at risk.  Discrimination against volunteers not 
only undermines the bottom line, but it threatens the stability of 
organizations and the many families who depend on them. 
IV.   REJECTION OF THE THRESHOLD-REMUNERATION TEST:  
PUBLIC HEALTH NECESSITATES A BROAD DEFINITION OF EMPLOYEE 
UNDER TITLE VII 
The question remains as to whether courts should adopt the threshold-
remuneration test or proceed directly to some form of the common law 
agency or economic realities test.  The common law agency test and its 
derivations use compensation as one of several factors considered in 
conjunction with “all of the incidents of the [putative employment] 
relationship.”364  In comparison, the threshold-remuneration test employs 
compensation as a singularly dispositive factor to determine whether an 
employment relationship exists.365  Under this narrow test, volunteers are 
often disqualified from Title VII protections due to a lack of substantial 
compensation.366 
As a result, courts must consider the implications of adopting a narrow 
test that often excludes volunteers from Title VII protections.  Thus far, the 
literature has been overly focused on the individual nature of workplace 
discrimination.367  It has viewed each incidence of discrimination only with 
respect to the impact on the particular individual.  However, the harm 
caused by discrimination extends beyond the targeted individual—in this 
case, the volunteer.368 
Title VII has a broad purpose.369  It not only remediates prior harm but 
also protects the public welfare.370  Therefore, when defining the scope of 
 
 360. Workplace discrimination imposes significant financial harm on business, creating 
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 361. Id. at 4. 
 362. Id. 
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Title VII, courts must consider how it will affect Title VII’s ability to 
protect the public welfare. 
Part IV.A argues that workplace discrimination against volunteers poses 
a significant public health issue by creating chronic health issues for the 
entire workforce, families, civil society, and employers.  As a result, Part 
IV.B asserts that courts should reject the threshold-remuneration test and 
adopt a broad definition of employee that includes volunteers in the interest 
of public health.  Lastly, Part IV.C provides supplemental support for the 
rejection of the threshold-remuneration test by referencing arguments 
unrelated to public health. 
A.   Reconceptualizing the Issue:  Workplace Discrimination Against 
Volunteers As a Public Health Issue 
Courts must reconceptualize discrimination as a broader public health 
issue and adopt a pluralistic understanding of the harm caused by 
discrimination.  Excessive focus on harm incurred by the single target of 
discrimination glosses over the familial,371 organizational,372 and societal373 
impact of workplace discrimination. 
Discriminatory conduct bleeds into daily interactions and creates an 
“arena of emotional brutality” that is characterized by “injuries of depleted 
self-esteem, lower morale and apathy.”374  Workplace discrimination is 
especially toxic because work is where the majority of the adult population 
spends its waking hours.375  And, it is where “much of one’s ‘significance’ 
is fostered.”376 
First, the section asserts that discrimination against volunteers negatively 
affects the health of the entire workplace, including non-targeted coworkers 
who are injured by witnessing or merely perceiving discrimination.  
Second, this section argues that discrimination against volunteers 
jeopardizes familial health.  Third, this section contends that discrimination 
against volunteers harms civil society.  Lastly, this section asserts that 
discrimination against volunteers threatens the health of businesses and 
organizations that permit such conduct. 
 
 371. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 372. See discussion supra Part III.A, D. 
 373. See discussion supra Part III.C. 
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1.   Coworker Health:  Discrimination Against Volunteers 
Harms the Entire Workforce 
The harmful effects of workplace discrimination against volunteers are 
not just borne by volunteers.  Discrimination against volunteers threatens 
the entire workplace. 
First, coworkers who witness discrimination against volunteers suffer 
bystander harm.377  Studies have shown that bystanders378 suffer harm to an 
equal or greater degree than direct victims of discrimination.379  Bystanders 
often express a loss of belief in justice and a caring community,380 as well 
as anxiety, overall poor health, and pain.381 
Therefore, coworkers who witness discrimination against volunteers are 
put at risk of physical and psychological harm.  Adopting a narrow 
definition of employee that excludes volunteers jeopardizes the health of 
even paid, traditional employees who are bystanders to the discrimination. 
Second, discrimination against volunteers increases perceptions of 
discrimination in the workplace.382  The inquiry is no longer limited to the 
effects of overt, targeted discrimination on a particular employee.  Studies 
have shown that mere perceptions of discrimination can lead to negative 
consequences.383  Non-targeted coworkers often develop a fear of becoming 
the target.384  Fear can quickly dominate the workplace and result in poor 
morale, decreased loyalty, and low productivity.385 
Employees are perceptive and know when discrimination happens.  
Coworkers may witness it directly, hear about it through water-cooler talk, 
or just feel its effect in daily interactions.386  Discriminatory conduct 
against volunteers will subtly creep into everyday workplace interactions, 
creating a toxic work environment.  Perceived mistreatment is a very real 
and damaging part of the work environment.387  A narrow definition of 
employee that favors traditional, paid employees over volunteers will foster 
perceptions of discrimination and inequality. 
Lastly, as a result, discriminatory conduct against volunteers threatens 
the health of traditional, paid coworkers who share a group-based identity 
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with the targeted volunteer.388  The law should offer special protection to 
individuals who suffer discrimination for immutable characteristics, as there 
is an “extraordinary destructiveness of being shamed for one’s very 
identity.”389  Discrimination against volunteers has consequences not only 
for the targeted individual but also for those who share similar group-based 
identities.  Courts should be particularly sensitive and adopt a broad 
definition of employee. 
2.   Familial Health:  Workplace Discrimination 
Against Volunteers Jeopardizes the Home 
The extent of the injury caused by discrimination against volunteers is 
not limited to the workplace.390  The injury is borne beyond the walls of the 
workplace, and families suffer as a result of workplace discrimination 
against volunteers.391 
Families function as interconnected units.392  As such, negative health 
effects of workplace discrimination are shared through familial interactions 
and communication.393  Like any other worker, volunteers are susceptible to 
“exporting” the effects of discrimination, manifesting into feelings of 
alienation, disconnectedness, and overburdening within their families.394 
Discrimination against volunteers puts children at particular risk.  
Children are particularly vulnerable to the effects of discrimination because 
they have a more difficult time understanding the reason for the volunteer’s 
behavior.395  As a result, they may internalize the harm and blame 
themselves for the volunteer’s behavior.396 
Harm to the family is especially troubling because the family is where 
children build foundational principles of morality, ethics, justice, and good 
citizenship.397  It is the bedrock of civil society.398  Parents serve as the 
primary role models for how children should treat others and how they 
should understand their role in society.399  Corrupting the family will lead 
to dangerous public health consequences not only for the family unit but 
also for a future generation of citizens who will lead our nation. 
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Discrimination against volunteers threatens the health of the family.  By 
not protecting volunteers, courts are putting the well being of their partners 
and children at risk. 
3.   Civic Health:  Discrimination Against Volunteers 
Threatens Civil Society 
The workplace—when it is an equal, cooperative environment—is a 
powerful tool to promote civic engagement and effective democratic self-
governance.400  However, if discrimination against volunteers is allowed, 
the workplace can serve as a vehicle for social hostility imposing 
citizenship harm, depleting social capital, and skewing the public discourse. 
First, discrimination against volunteers inflicts citizenship harm.  Public 
discourse legitimizes and facilitates modern democratic self-governance.401  
As traditional forms of public engagement have declined, the workplace has 
become an essential forum for public discourse.402 
Employers who exclude volunteers from the workplace or discriminate 
therein inflict citizenship harm, by disturbing relationships among co-
citizens and their ability to grasp the meaning of the existing political 
order.403  Such “citizenship harm” places a greater burden on the law to 
intervene and protect those individuals.404 
The workplace is an important site for political and moral learning.405  A 
narrow definition of “employee” that uses compensation as a dispositive 
factor creates a second class of workers—those employees who are less 
valuable and less worthy of a workplace free from discrimination.  It 
imposes a caste-like system, within which volunteers are relegated to a 
second-class tier.  It creates a marginalized workforce that instills moral and 
political values that are inherently at odds with modern democratic society. 
Second, discrimination against volunteers depletes social capital and 
inhibits societal integration and equality.  Modern society depends upon 
“social capital,” and the workplace is an essential source of such capital.406  
The workplace brings people from varying backgrounds together to work 
toward a common goal.407  It can transform attitudes on divisive issues such 
as race and sex.408  Employees can export these progressive views into their 
communities.409 
However, employees can export negative experiences into their 
communities just as easily as they can positive ones.  In theory, the 
workplace is an ideal place to promote civic integration because Title VII 
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2014] TITLE VII PROTECTIONS FOR VOLUNTEERS 1493 
“seek[s] to reconstruct the workplace as a realm of equality on the basis of 
race, sex, and other traits that have traditionally been the basis for 
subordination and sometimes segregation, and that still divide us.”410  
However, if Title VII’s protections are granted to only a narrow subset of 
workers receiving compensation, workplaces can easily become 
environments of hierarchy, coercion, and harassment.411  The workplace 
can be a powerful progressive tool only if the workplace is a positive, 
cooperative environment that protects vulnerable groups, like volunteers, 
from discrimination. 
Lastly, by bringing their discrimination to light in a public forum,412 Title 
VII ensures that volunteers are not invisible victims.  Title VII creates a 
public record of workplace discrimination.413  If Title VII does not 
recognize volunteers as employees, the record will not accurately reflect the 
actual level of discrimination in a particular workplace or across the 
nation.414  Prospective employees will not be able to properly evaluate 
potential employers.  Judges will render decisions based on an imprecise 
record.  Public policy perceptions of discrimination will be inaccurate, and 
our legislatures will not be able to make necessary reforms. 
Studies have shown that there is a public perception that discrimination 
in the workplace is largely a thing of the past415 and that there is a latent 
judicial bias against plaintiffs in employment claims.416  Title VII plaintiffs 
are unlikely to succeed when compared with other federal claimants.417  
Traditional employees bringing Title VII claims would benefit from a 
record that reflected discrimination claims made by other victims, such as 
volunteers.418  If discrimination against volunteers is not recognized, their 
stories cannot be used to inform or change perceptions of workplace 
discrimination.419 
Furthermore, an important form of deterrence is lost.420  Employment 
legislation was meant to facilitate discrimination claims so that 
discrimination would be brought to light in a public forum and remedial 
mechanisms would deter employers from similar conduct.421  If volunteers 
are not recognized, they become invisible victims.  Their experiences 
cannot benefit traditional, paid employees who are suffering similar 
discrimination. 
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4.   Employer Health:  Discrimination Against Volunteers 
Harms Employer Health 
Employment scholarship often focuses on the harm discrimination 
inflicts on employees.  However, discrimination against volunteers 
jeopardizes the health of the employer as well.422  Discrimination fosters 
toxic work environments, which undercuts productivity, morale, and 
loyalty.423  This negatively affects retention, which is important to a 
company’s financial strength and competitive edge.424  Discrimination also 
results in significant reputational costs, as employees who leave jobs later 
discourage potential customers and job applicants from working with their 
former employers.425  Discrimination puts the health of the business and the 
job of each employee at risk.426 
B.   Proposing a Broad Definition of “Employee” 
in the Interest of Public Health 
Workplace discrimination against volunteers poses a larger public health 
issue.427  The harm extends beyond the targeted individual to coworkers, 
families, businesses, and civic society.428  As a result, each incidence of 
discrimination against volunteers can no longer be viewed only with respect 
to the impact to the particular volunteer.  A tort-like approach seeking to 
remedy only the particular harm caused to the target of discrimination is 
inadequate.  The harm caused to the entire workforce,429 families,430 civil 
society,431 and employers432 requires a more proactive approach. 
To truly combat the public health issues caused by workplace 
discrimination, courts must take prophylactic measures to prevent 
discrimination and the resulting familial, organizational, and societal harm.  
One such preventative measure is to adopt a broad definition of employee 
that prohibits discrimination against volunteers in the workplace. 
The threshold-remuneration test imposes a narrow definition of 
employee, in which compensation is a singularly dispositive factor.433  
Under this test, any volunteer not receiving “substantial compensation” 
would not be considered an employee, leaving a significant population of 
workers unprotected.  This would open the door for increased workplace 
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discrimination, which has serious health consequences beyond just the 
targeted individual.434 
In comparison, the common law agency, economic realities, and hybrid 
tests offer broad and flexible definitions of employee, in which 
compensation is one of several factors considered in conjunction with “all 
the incidents of the [putative employment] relationship.”435  The Supreme 
Court has generally defined the scope of the employment relationship 
expansively to effectuate Congress’s broad remedial purpose for Title 
VII.436  The Court has stated that it must avoid interpretations that deprive 
victims of discrimination of a remedy.437  There is no reason why the 
employment relationship should not be interpreted expansively once more 
to include volunteers and provide them a remedy. 
When deciding among the common law agency, economic realities, and 
hybrid tests, courts should adopt the broadest approach to best protect the 
public from the negative health effects of workplace discrimination.  The 
hybrid test is popular,438 as it appears to offer the best of both worlds.439  It 
incorporates the more expansive economic realities factors, while still 
maintaining the right to control analysis.440  However, courts should not 
feel bound to selecting one of these three existing tests, as the factors listed 
in the common law agency test were never meant to be exhaustive.441  
Regardless of which of the three tests is selected, courts should be careful 
not to adopt the threshold-remuneration test. 
C.   Supplemental Support for Rejecting the Threshold-Remuneration Test 
For those who are not satisfied with rejecting the threshold-remuneration 
test solely on the grounds that discrimination against volunteers creates 
substantial public health issues, there are several other reasons for reaching 
this conclusion. 
First, the narrow threshold-remuneration test is at odds with the broad 
remedial purpose of Title VII.442  Congress intended Title VII to grant all 
individuals the right to be employed without discrimination.443  Title VII 
served a remedial purpose “to assure equality of employment opportunities, 
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in particular to protect employees with little bargaining power.”444  
Volunteers are particularly vulnerable workers with little bargaining 
power.445  Without Title VII protection, volunteers become second-class 
citizens, deprived of the privileges and protections of full-time employees.  
It is doubtful that Congress intended to stratify the workforce with unequal 
disbursement of Title VII’s protections. 
Second, the threshold-remuneration test does not comport with the 
standard set in Darden.446  In Darden, the Supreme Court held that the 
common law agency test is the default standard when Congress has been 
silent on the appropriate one.447  The threshold-remuneration test imposes 
an artificial antecedent question of whether an individual is “hired” before 
proceeding to the common law agency factors.448 
Proponents of the threshold-remuneration test argue that the Darden 
Court’s use of the term “hired party” was a conscious decision to create an 
antecedent question of whether a party was hired or not.449  However, 
courts, such as the Sixth Circuit, have sufficiently rebutted this argument.450  
In Bryson, the Sixth Circuit clarified that the “Supreme Court included the 
term ‘hired party’ in Darden only in a direct quote from its decision in Reid, 
and the Reid Court’s use of ‘hired party’ was in the context of the ‘work for 
hire’ provision from the Copyright Act.”451  The Court intended the 
common law agency test to apply “when Congress has used the term 
‘employee’ without defining it,” not just when the individual receives 
significant remuneration.452 
Third, the threshold-remuneration test creates new areas of uncertainty in 
the law given the lack of clarity as to what constitutes “substantial 
compensation.”453  Under the threshold-remuneration test, employee status 
turns on whether an individual received adequate compensation to establish 
an employment relationship.454  After Haavistola, it is unclear what indirect 
benefits are sufficient enough to be considered substantial compensation.455  
As a result, the outcome of such claims will depend on the particular 
judge’s interpretation of substantial compensation.456  This creates 
 
 444. Kean, supra note 64, at 166 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 445. See supra note 169 and accompanying text. 
 446. See, e.g., Bryson v. Middlefield Volunteer Fire Dep’t, Inc., 656 F.3d 348, 354 (6th 
Cir. 2011). 
 447. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322–23 (1992). 
 448. See supra note 27. 
 449. See, e.g., O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 450. See supra note 27. 
 451. See supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
 452. See Bryson, 656 F.3d at 354 (quoting Community for Creative Non-Violence v. 
Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739–40 (1989)). 
 453. See supra notes 159, 180–81 and accompanying text. 
 454. See Pietras v. Bd. of Fire Comm’rs of Farmingville Fire Dist., 180 F.3d 468, 473 (2d 
Cir. 1999); see also O’Connor, 126 F.3d at 116. 
 455. See supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
 456. For example, in Pietras, the Second Circuit found that a volunteer firewoman could 
be an “employee” under Title VII because she received insurance retirement benefits. See 
Pietras, 180 F.3d at 473.  However, in Juino, the Fifth Circuit found that insurance and 
2014] TITLE VII PROTECTIONS FOR VOLUNTEERS 1497 
significant room for judicial discretion and unknowable variables in the law 
that prevent volunteers from planning their lives accordingly. 
Lastly, the nature of the workplace has changed.  Traditional paid 
employees are becoming less common as technology allows us to work 
remotely from any corner of the world.  Furthermore, in these difficult 
economic times, individuals are working several jobs to make ends meet 
and traditional 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. jobs are harder to find.457  Since there 
are fewer full-time employees, “litigation with respect to the status of 
employers is likely to continue because relationships will be increasingly 
atypical and will not involve a direct employer-employee relationship.”458  
The rigidity of the threshold-remuneration test would leave a substantial 
portion of nontraditional workers, such as volunteers, unprotected. 
CONCLUSION 
Volunteers are an essential part of our society, and the United States 
strongly encourages volunteerism.459  This commitment to volunteerism has 
only been strengthened.460 
Despite our nation’s increased reliance on volunteers, efforts to protect 
them have not increased.461  And, there is a growing need for protection as 
they are particularly vulnerable to exploitation.462 
Discrimination against volunteers creates a serious public health issue.463  
A narrow definition of employee in which compensation is dispositive 
fosters toxic working environments by creating a class of workers that are 
entirely unprotected by Title VII.  Such discrimination against volunteers 
can lead to widespread health costs because the harm of discrimination is 
not borne solely by the targeted individual.464  Discrimination must be 
reconceptualized as a general public health issue.465  Discrimination against 
volunteers threatens the health of the entire workforce,466 families,467 civil 
society,468 and employers.469  Therefore, courts should reject the threshold-
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remuneration test because discrimination against volunteers jeopardizes the 
public welfare.470 
 
 470. See discussion supra Part IV.A–B. 
